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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Larry Dean Corwin appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence
entered following a jury verdict finding him guilty of DUI and a bench verdict
enhancing that DUI to felony status.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
Corwin was involved in a high speed accident on 1-84 between Nampa
and Caldwell. (R., p.5.) He was subsequently charged with operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or an intoxicating substance and
with a felony enhancement because this was his third DUI offense. (R., pp.8-10;
pp.32-35.)
At trial, a witness to the accident, Stephanie Lane, testified she was
traveling 70 miles per hour in the passing lane of the freeway when she saw a
white car approaching her traveling at high speeds. (Vol. I, Tr., p.29, Ls.17-24.)
She testified she observed the driver in her rear view mirror and that the driver of
the vehicle was a white male. (Vol. I, Tr., p.31, Ls.11-23.) She described his
face as "wide-eyed, scared look, panic." (Vol. I, Tr., p.32, Ls.11-15.)
Ms. Lane testified that although she sped up, the white car bumped her
from behind causing a 'Terking thud." (Vol. I, Tr., p.33, Ls.13-19.) Ms. Lane
stated that she pulled off the side of the road and that she saw the white car
"spin very quickly to the left out of control and start flipping in the median divider."
(Vol. I, Tr., p.33, Ls.13-23.) When the car stopped rolling over it ended up
upside down in the opposite lane of traffic. (Vol. I, Tr., p.68, Ls.3-7.)

Julian Aguirre also witnessed the accident and testified at the trial. Mr.
Aguirre testified that just prior to the accident, Corwin nearly hit him and then cut
him off. (Vol. I, Tr., p.54, L.25 - p.57, L.12.) Kenneth Seward was also driving
on 1-84 and also witnessed the accident. Mr. Seward was traveling in the same
direction as Corwin, Mr. Aguirre, and Ms. Lane. (Vol. I, Tr., p.64, Ls.14-21.) Mr.
Seward testified that the white car passed him going very fast and that the driver
of the vehicle was a white male wearing a blue baseball cap. (Vol. I, Tr., p.65,
L.21

- p.67,

L.6; p.77, Ls.20-22.) Mr. Seward also testified that the driver was

alone in the vehicle. (Vol. I, Tr., p.78, Ls.6-15.) After witnessing the accident,
Mr. Seward called 911. (Vol. I, Tr., p.78, Ls.1-5.)
Caldwell Police Officer Anthony Pittz was dispatched to the accident.
(Vol. I, Tr., p.83, Ls.9-13.) Officer Pittz testified that when he first arrived he
searched the upside down vehicle to make sure that nobody was trapped inside.
(Vol. I, Tr., p.85, Ls.5-9.)

There was no one in the vehicle, but the officer

smelled a strong odor of alcohol and observed beer dripping from the floor
boards. (Vol. I, Tr., p.85, L.5

-

p.87, L.18.)

The officer also stated that he

observed beer cans outside the driver's side window. (Vol. I, Tr., p.88, Ls.1922.)
Idaho State Police Trooper Deshan Cabaong testified that he too
responded to the scene. Trooper Cabaong testified that he observed a blue
baseball cap and an empty box of beer outside the wrecked car. (Vol. I, Tr.,
p.157, Ls.2-16; p.161, Ls.3-21.) Officer Pittz ultimately located Corwin, the driver
of the vehicle, hiding behind a bush in a pasture running along the freeway. (Vol.

I, Tr., p.89, L.2 - p.90, L.21.) The officer stated that he asked Corwin, who had
blood smears and stains on his t-shirt, if he had any injuries from the crash, to
which Corwin replied, "What crash? I don't know what you're talking about."
(Vol. I, Tr., p.91, L.6 - p.92, L.4.) Officer Pittz testified that Corwin kept repeating
this line over and over in response to his questions. (Vol. I, Tr., p.91, Ls.20-24;
p.130, LS.14-20.)
Officer Pittz testified that Corwin had alcohol on his breath (Vol. I, Tr.,
p.94, Ls.9-18), that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot (Vol. I, Tr., p.95, Ls.1214). and that he was agitated (Voi. I, Tr., p.97, L.23

-

p.98, L.5).

Trooper

Caboang testified that Corwin ultimately admitted to him that he had been
drinking. (Vol. I, Tr., p.165, L.22 - p.166, L.1.) The trooper testified that Corwin
then admitted to being in the accident, but claimed that he was not driving the
vehicle. (Vol. I, Tr., p.169, L.24 - p.170, L.3.) Trooper Caboang also stated that
Corwin had bloodshot eyes, that his speech was slurred, and that he had shaky
hand movements. (Vol. I, Tr., p.166, Ls.11-16.) The trooper also testified that
he performed a field sobriety test on Corwin, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test,
and that Corwin failed this test. (Vol. I, Tr., p.181, L.4, L.186, L.5.) Officer Pittz
and Trooper Cabaong both testified that based on the experience and training,
they believed Corwin was impaired by his consumption of alcohol. (Vol. I, Tr.,
p.100, Ls.8-14; p.187, Ls.3-5; p.196, L.15 - p.197, L.3.)
Trooper Cabaong testified that Corwin was arrested and transported to
the county jail.

(Vol. I, Tr., p.187, Ls.1-5.) At the jail, Corwin was given the

opportunity to take a breathalyzer test. The trooper testified that Corwin, who

continued to be difficult and combative, refused to take the test. (Vol. I, Tr.,
p.193, L.16 - p.194, L.4.)
The jury found Corwin guilty of driving under the influence. (R., p.92.)
Corwin waived his right to jury trial on part ll of the charging document, the felony
enhancement for the prior convictions. (R., p.98.) The court found Corwin guilty
of the enhancements (R., p.113), and sentenced Corwin to a unified sentence of
10 years, with five years fixed (R., pp.113-14). Corwin filed a Rule 35 motion
that the district court denied. (R., pp.$33-38.) Corwin subsequently filed a timely
appeal from the district court's judgment and commitment. (R., pp.113-17.)

ISSUES
Corwin states the issues on appeal as:
I

Did the State's questions regarding whether law enforcement
officers believed that Mr. Corwin was intoxicated impermissibly
invade the province of the jury?

2.

Did the prosecutor's closing remarks at sentencing regarding
the prosecutor's personal belief in the guilt of the defendant
constitute prosecutorial misconduct?

3.

Did the district court manifest disregard I.C.R. 32 when it
sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of the substance
abuse evaluation that was ordered for purposes of sentencing,
and further abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Corwin's
Rule 35 motion that requested such evaluation be actually
performed?

(Appellant's Brief, p.1I.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Corwin failed to meet his burden of showing that the law
enforcement officers' testimony that Corwin was intoxicated
impermissibly invaded the province of the jury?

2.

The prosecutor, in closing argument and without objection, stated that
she personally believed Corwin was intoxicated. Has Corwin failed to
show this one isolated statement was made to inflame the passions of
jury and was so improper that a timely objection and action by the trial
court could not have cured any potential prejudice?

3.

Has Corwin shown he is entitled to be resentenced because no
substance abuse evaluation was attached to the PSI, where the
evaluation was ordered and where it was Corwin's responsibility to
provide that evaluation to the court?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Err Or Abuse Its Discretion BV Permittinq The Law
Enforcement Officers To Offer Their Opinion That Corwin Was Under The
Influence Of Alcohol
A.

Introduction
Corwin asserts the district court abused its discretion and violated his due

process by permitting law enforcement officers to testify "whether Mr. Corwin
was driving under the influence of alcohol."

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

Specifically, Corwin claims error because he asserts this was "the ultimate issue
for the jury's determination" and that as such, the district court "prejudiced Mr.
Corwin's right to a jury trial."

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Cowin's claim lacks

merit. There was no invasion into the province of the jury. Furthermore, to the
extent that Corwin claims the officers' testimony was not proper expert
testimony, this argument was not raised below, and, even if it was, is not
supported by case law. There is nothing that precludes law enforcement officers
from offering their opinion based on their personal observations of the
defendant.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such

as claimed due process violations is one of deference to factual findings, unless
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317,

322, 859 P.2d 353, 358 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Doe, 131 ldaho 709, 963 P.2d
392 (Ct. App. 1998).
C.

Officer Pittz And Trooper Baaaonn's Opinion That Corwin Was Intoxicated
Did Not Invade The Province Of The Jun/ And Was Not Reversible Simply
Because It Embraced An Ultimate Issue
The "ultimate issue" argument made by Corwin was abolished by ldaho

Rule of Evidence 704, which allows testimony "in the form of an opinion or
inference" that "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
I.R.E. 704. Accordingly, simply because Officer Pittz and Trooper Cabaong
testified as to a dispositive issue --whether Corwin was impaired by his admitted
consumption of alcohol -- is not a basis for claiming error.
Under Idaho's rules of evidence, the only improper invasion of the
province of the jury is where one witness passes upon the credibility of other
witnesses. See State v. Hester, 114 ldaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988);
State v. Puasley, 128 ldaho 168, 175, 91 1 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1995).
Corwin, however, makes no such claim. Here the officer's opinion was based on
their own personal observations and unrelated to any other fact witness. Indeed,
nowhere does Corwn assert that law enforcement vouched for the credibility of
any witness. The claim here is limited to whether the district court erred by
permitting "law enforcement officers to repeatedly testify, over Mr. Corwin's
objections, as to the ultimate issue for the jury's determination." (Appellant's
Brief, p.12.) Consequently, there is no basis for asserting error on the basis of
the objection Corwin asserted at trial -- that law enforcement's opinion testimony
invaded the province of the jury.

D.

Corwin Has Failed To Preserve An Ar~ument That The Officer's
Testimonv Was Improper Expert Witness Testimony
As set forth above, Corwin objected on the basis that law enforcement's

opinion invaded the province of the jury. Corwin did not object to Officer Pittz
and Trooper Cabaong's testimony on the basis that it was improper expert
witness testimony. Consequently, he has failed to preserve this issue on appeal.
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v.
Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether the issue
was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 ldaho 457, 459,
767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (objections at trial on other grounds did not
preserve issue raised on appeal). The admission of evidence cannot be found to
be erroneous in the absence of a timely objection clearly "stating the specific
ground of objection," unless the ground is apparent from the context. I.R.E.
103(a)(l); State v. Gleason, 130 ldaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 723, 727 (Ct. App.
1997). Likewise, an objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and
different basis for excluding evidence. State v. Norton, 134 ldaho 875, 879, 11
P.3d 494, 498 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Enveart, 123 ldaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d
125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993) (limiting appellate review to scope of objection).
The transcript shows the specific ground upon which Corwin objected to
Officer Pittz's testimony:
Q.

Based on your training and experience did you believe Mr.
Corwin to be under the influence of alcohol?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. That's invading the province
of the jury.

Phe Court]: Overruled.
(Vol. I, Tr., p.100, Ls.8-10.) Corwin objected on the same basis with regard to
Trooper Cabaong's testimony:

Q.

As a result of the observations that you made on scene with
regards to the odor and the eyes, his performance on the
field sobriety tests, and his refusal to submit to a breath test,
what determination did you make with regards to Mr. Corwin
and his ability to successfully operate a vehicle?

A.

I determined that Mr. ~orw'in
was impaired and --

[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. That's speculation. That's
invading the province of the jury.
[The Court]: Overruled.
(Vol. I, Tr., p.196, Ls.15-25.) Thus, the objection was limited and clearly not
whether the officer's opinion met the requirements of being expert testimony.'
Consequently, this issue has not been preserved, and Corwin is barred from
raising that issue for the first time on appeal.

1

Corwin cites State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 698, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988), for
the proposition that regardless of I.R.E. 704, that permits a witness to give
testimony on an ultimate issue, an expert witness must still meet the
independent requirements of I.R.E. 702 in order to testify. There is nothing in
however, that supports Corwin's assumption that a "province of the jury"
argument preserves an I.R.E. 702 argument. In m r , the defendant objected
on the basis that the officer's statements were improper expert witness
testimony. Id.at 692, 760 P.2d at 31. Here, where no such objection was made,
an I.R.E. 702 deficiency cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

m,

E.

Even If Corwin Preserved His Claim, The Trial Court Properly Exercised
Its Discretion By Permittina The Officers To Give Their Opinion That
Corwin Was Intoxicated
Even if Corwin somehow preserved his claim below, the trial court

properly exercised its discretion by allowing Officer Pittz and Trooper Cabaong to
offer their opinion. It is well established that the admission of expert opinion
testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 702 is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Merwin, 131 ldaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029
(1998); State v. Konechny, 134 ldaho 410, 414, 3 P.3d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 2000).
Corwin has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
At trial, an officer may give his opinion as to whether a particular suspect

was intoxicated. In State v. Gleason, 123 ldaho 62, 63-64, 844 P.2d 691, 69293 (1992), officers stopped Gleason whom they suspected of driving under the
influence of alcohol.

Id.at 64, 844 P.2d 693.

The vehicle had been weaving in

its lane and when the officer made contact with Gleason the officer noticed
alcohol on Gleason's breath and that his eyes were watery and bloodshot.
One officer noticed a plastic cup in vehicle that contained alcohol.

Id.

Id.
The

officers administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to Gleason which he
failed.
him.

Id.

The officers concluded that Gleason was intoxicated and arrested

Id. At trial, over Gleason's objection, one of the officers was

allowed to

give his opinion, based on his personal observations of Gleason and based on
the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, that Gleason was intoxicated.
Id. Subsequent officers also gave their opinion based on field tests "and their
-

personal observations of Gleason's erratic driving pattern and uncoordinated
mannerisms" that Gleason was impaired.

a

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit this
evidence. The court held that the officer "did not venture beyond permissive
bounds when he testified that, based on Gleason's performance on the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test and other tests, the officer was of the opinion
that Gleason was intoxicated."

Id. at 66, 844 P.2d

at 695 (emphasis added).

The court noted that:
r h e officer] did not offer the HGN test results as independent,
scientifically sound evidence of Gleason's intoxication. Rather, it
was offered and admitted for the same purpose as other field
sobriety test evidence -- a physical act on the part of Gleason
observed by the officer contributing to the cumulative portrait of
Gleason intimating intoxication in the officer's opinion.
Id.
In the case at hand, the law enforcement officers' testimony was similarly
proper.

Like the officer in Gleason, the officers here based their opinion a

number of factors -- Corwin's failed field sobriety test, their personal observations
of Corwin's bloodshot and glassy eyes, the odor of his breath, his slurred
speech, his shakiness, his response to questions and apparent lack of memory,
his erratic driving resulting in the accident, the fact that he admitted that he had
been drinking, the alcohol found at the scene, and the fact that he was agitated
and combative.

Consequently, like the opinion testimony of the officers in

Gleason, Trooper Cabaong and Officer Pittz's testimony was well within the
discretion of the court to admit

Corwin's cites State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 331, 127 P.3d 231, 234
(Ct. App. 2005). for the proposition that an officer cannot offer an opinion that a
defendant is intoxicated. Corwin specifically points out the fact that the court
made a distinction between testimony regarding symptoms and testimony
regarding impairment. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Corwin's reliance is misplaced.
Burrow did not address whether an officer, testifying as an expert can render
testimony on intoxication, but rather whether "the foundation for the officer's
testimony was insufficient."

fd.at 330, 127 P.3d at 234.

Accordingly, the court

noted that the "type of foundation that will be required for admission of expert
testimony necessarily turns upon the nature of the evidence offered."

fd.

Consequently, the court distinguished between testimony regarding scientific
symptoms and more common manifestations of drug use.

fd. As such, the court

reasoned:
There is a vast difference between the foundation needed to show
that an expert witness employed an accurate and reliable
methodology to arrive at a complex scientific, medical or technical
opinion (such as a psychological opinion as to whether a child has
been sexually abused, or a scientific opinion about the statistical
reliability of a DNA match), and the foundation needed for a
witness to r e ~ o r this aersonal observations of an individual's
physical appearance and behavior and compare these with the
common manifestations of drug use known to the observer through
his training and experience. Here, the officer did not render an
opinion that Burrow was under the influence of drugs but, rather,
that he displayed certain symptoms that are consistent with those
shown by persons who are under the in.fluence of
methamphetamine or similar substances. While this distinction may
be subtle, it is nevertheless real and significant. We ail know, for
example, that labored breathing and a flushed face are physical
symptoms consistent with those displayed by someone who has
just been running hard, although the same symptoms could also be
the result of an entirely different behavior or condition. No

description of a "methodology" would be necessary for admission
of testimonv that a defendant disdaved
. . such svmptoms where the
evidence isoffered to raise an inference that the defendant was the
person who, minutes earlier, had been observed running away from
a crime scene. Likewise here, the officer merely described his
personal observations of Burrow's condition and expressed his
knowledge, based on specific training and experience, that those
symptoms he observed are consistent with drug-induced
intoxication. Beyond that, there was no "methodology" employed
that required foundational explanation or validation.
Id. at 331,
-

127 P.3d at 234. Burrow does not support Cowin's argument. If

anything, the analysis in Burrow supports the trial court's exercise of discretion to
permit the opinion testimony."
F.

The Error Corwin Alleqes. If Error, Is Harmless
ldaho Criminal Rule 52 directs that "[alny error, defect, irregularity, or

variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." "An
appellant has the burden to show prejudicial error, and absent such a showing,
error will be deemed harmless." State v. Rodriquez, 106 ldaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d
1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 1983)

(mState v. Ellis, 99 ldaho 606, 586 P.2d 1050

(1978)). "The erroneous admission of evidence does not in every case require
reversal. Such error will be deemed harmless if an appellate court finds, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously
admitted evidence contributed to the conviction."

2

Id. Alternatively, an error is

Even if the opinion testimony was not properly admitted as "expert witness"
testimony, the testimony was admissible as lay opinion. See, e.g., State v.
Cooper, 119 ldaho 654, 657, 809 P.2d 515, 518 (Ct. App. 1991) ("While a
statement that a driver was intoxicated is in part conclusory, it is the kind of
shorthand statement of fact that witnesses have always been permitted to testify
in court.")

harmless if an appellate court is able to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
jury would have reached the same result absent the error. State v. Sandoval-

m,138 ldaho 908, 911, 71 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2003); State v. Moore, 131
ldaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998); Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 925,
877 P.2d 365, 369 (1994)); see also State v. Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 363, 972
P.2d 737,741 (Ct. App. 1998).
A review of the record establishes that any error Corwin alleges was
committed by the admission of the law enforcement's opinion was harmless.

Cf.

State v. Lesley, 133 ldaho 23, 27, 981 P.2d 748, 752 (Ct. App. 1999). The
evidence of Corwin's driving behavior, combined with evidence of the personal
observations of Corwin by the officers, the physical evidence at the scene,
including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, coupled with Corwin's admissions
that he had been drinking, provided an ample evidentiary basis for the verdict.
Stephanie Lane, Kenneth Seward, and Julian Aguirre gave first hand accounts of
Corwin's erratic driving that led to the accident. Both Officer Pittz and Trooper
Cabaong testified that they smelled alcohol on Corwin's breath and in his vehicle.
Trooper Cabaong testified that Corwin admitted that he had been drinking, that
his speech was slurred and that he was shaking. Officer Pittz testified that his
eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that he kept repeating himself about not
being in an accident. Both law enforcement officers testified that Corwin was
agitated and that there was alcohol in Corwin's vehicle. Trooper Cabaong
further testified that Corwin failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test he
administered and that he refused the breathalyzer.

Even if this Court finds that the law enforcement officers' opinion was
improperly admitted, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There
is no reasonable possibility that this portion of the officers' testimony might have
contributed to Corwin's conviction because the evidence was overwhelming.
The jury would have reached the same result absent the challenged testimony
because the challenged testimony was only a small part of the entire case
against Corwin.
Accordingly, given the weight of the other evidence admitted, there can be
no reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without
the admission of the officers' challenged testimony.

11.
Corwin's Claimed Instance Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Does Not Rise To The
Level Of Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Corwin claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when the prosecutor

stated her personal opinion that Corwin was under the influence of alcohol and
too impaired to drive. (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Corwin has failed to show error
let alone fundamental error. Taken in context, the prosecutor's statement was
not her personal opinion but a summary of Officer Pittz's testimony. Moreover,
even if the statement was error, Corwin has not shown the error was
fundamental. Corwin has failed to show that the statement was so egregious
that any prejudice arising therefrom was not, or could not have been, remedied
by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the statement should be
disregarded.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only when the

conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter,
130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P:2d 127, 140 (1997); see also State v. MacDonald,
131 ldaho 367,956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998).
C.

Corwin Has Failed To Establish That The Prosecutor Committed
Misconduct: The Prosecutor's Statement Was A Summatv Of Officer
Pittz's Opinion Not Her Personal Opinion
Corwin claims the prosecutor, during closing, stated her personal opinion

that Corwin was under the influence and too impaired to drive a motor vehicle.
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Corwin takes this argument out of context. When
placed in context and given a fair reading, the prosecutor's statements were a
characterization of Officer Pittz's testimony, not the prosecutor's personal
opinion, that Corwin was intoxicated and impaired. Accordingly, there was no
misconduct and no error that merits reversal.
The prosecutor provided the following argument identifying the opinions
offered by Officer Pittz and Trooper Cabaong:
You've heard from both officers. Both officers, based on their
training, based on their experience gave an opinion as to whether
or not they believed Mr. Corwin could safely operate a motor
vehicle. Officer Pittz, who has been an officer years, who is a field
training officer himself, gave his opinion. Based in my opinion i
believe Mr. Convin was too -- was under the influence and too
impaired to drive a motor vehicle.
And you heard from Trooper Cabaong who is new. . . . Based on
his experience, based on his training he believed Mr. Corwin was
under the influence of alcohol and could not safely operate a motor
vehicle.

(Vol. I, Tr., p.313, L.16

-

p.314, L.lO.) Taken in context, the prosecutor was

summarizing the testimony of both officers and not offering her personal opinion.
Indeed, if the punctuation in the transcript was different, if the period after
"opinion" was a colon, a semi-colon, or a dash, there would not be even the
potential for this argument. (Vol. I, Tr., p.313, Ls.20-24 (Officer Pittz, who has
been an officer for years, who is a field training officer himself, gave his opinion[:]
Based in my opinion, I believe Mr. Corwin was too -- was under the influence and
too impaired to drive a motor vehicle.")
Additionally, the structure of the argument shows the prosecutor was
summarizing the testimony of the two officers. She began her remarks: "You've
heard from both officers." (Vol. I, Tr., p.313, L.16.) The prosecutor then stated
that Officer Pittz gave his opinion and then restated that opinion as provided by
Officer Pittz during trial. Per Corwin's reading, the prosecutor states that Officer
Pittz had an opinion, then without saying what that opinion is, referenced her
own person opinion. This is not a fair reading of the transcript. The fair reading
is that the prosecutor stated that the officer had an opinion and then said what
that opinion was.

This interpretation is also supported by the prosecutor's

reference to Trooper Cabaong's opinion. In fact, the prosecutor did the same
thing with Trooper Cabaong's testimony -- she reminded the jury that the trooper
offered his opinion and then restated that opinion. Accordingly, it would be
entirely out of context and inconsistent to read the prosecutor's statement as
anything other than a summary of the officer's opinion. Consequently, Corwin's
claim that the prosecutor offered her personal opinion is without merit.

D.

Even If The Prosecutor's Statement Could Be Construed As Error, The
Claimed Error Did Not Rise To The Level Of Fundamental Error
Even if the record could be reasonably construed as a statement of

personal opinion, no fundamental error is shown because the comment, in
context is ambiguous. Appellate review of Corwin's allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct is restricted by Convin's admitted failure to object to this comment at
the time it was made. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.)
A timely objection enables the trial judge to rule on the alleged error,
provide a curative admonition to the jury if appropriate, and prevent the
continuation of the alleged misconduct. State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 13, 909
P.2d 624,631 (Ct. App. 1995). In the absence of a timely objection to an alleged
error at trial, the error generally will not be considered on appeal.

Id.

In a

criminal case, however, courts "temper the failure to timely preserve an issue by
the doctrine of fundamental error." Id; see also State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559,
571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) ("When there is no contemporaneous objection a
conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is
sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental error.")
It is well established that "[pJrosecutorial misconduct during closing
arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so
egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments
should be disregarded." State v. Cortez, 135 ldaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502
(Ct. App. 2001).

Here, even if the prosecutor's statement could be reasonably construed
as a statement of her own personal belief that Corwin was intoxicated, it is a
misconduct that does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Corwin has not
shown the prosecuting attorney's "personal opinion" was made to inflame the
jury or arouse passion or prejudice against Corwin. Nor are the comments "so
inflammatory that the jurors would have been inferred to determine guilt on
factors outside the evidence."

See State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 48, 175 P.3d

206, 210 (Ct. App. 2007).

Indeed, because it is reasonable in context to

conclude the prosecutor was stating Officer Pittz's opinion, not her own, an
objection was required for not other reason than to clarify a potentially confusing
statement.
The prosecutor was merely analyzing the evidence and stating the
conclusions drawn from the evidence.

There was nothing in the record to

suggest this one comment was made to inflame or arouse the passions of the
jury. Furthermore, this is precisely the type of issue that can be remedied by a
ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be
disregarded. This is particularly the case here, where it may not be clear whose
opinion is being offered.

Consequently, regardless of whether there was

misconduct, it was not misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error
mandating reversal.

Ill.
Corwin's Failure To Provide The Court A Substance Abuse Report Is Not A
Basis For Resentencing
Corwin asserts the district court improperly sentenced him and erred in
denying his Rule 35 motion because "no [substance abuse] evaluation was
performed" pursuant to ldaho Code s18-8005(9).

(Appellant's Brief, p.23.)

Corwin claims sentencing him without the substance abuse evaluation was a
"manifest disregard of the requirements of I.C.R. 3 2 and, consequently, the
case should be remanded so that he can be resentenced. (Appellant's Brief,
p.24.) Corwin's claim is without merit. As a threshold matter, the court ordered
the substance abuse evaluation. Additionally, it was Corwin's responsibility to
get that evaluation and provide it to the court prior to sentencing.
The record shows the court ordered a substance abuse evaluation:
THE COURT:

Is this also an appropriate case to have an
alcohol evaluation to be prepared?

[Prosecutor]:

Yea, I believe so.

THE COURT:

I think that would be required. I will order an
alcohol evaluation to be prepared.

Mr. Onanubosi [defense counsel], do you
desire to have your own evaluator? Or use the
gentleman normally used by Canyon County?
[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Limus will be fine.
I will order that to be prepared by Mr. Limus

THE COURT:

(Vol. ll, Tr., p.43, Ls.10-21.)
ldaho Code

3

18-8005 makes clear that once the substance abuse

evaluation is ordered, it is the defendant's responsibility to get that evaluation to

the sentencing court.

Section 18-8005(9) further provides that where an

evaluation is not provided to the court by the defendant, that failure will not
preclude the defendant from being sentenced, but may be considered an
aggravating factor at sentencing:
The person shall request that a copy of the completed evaluation
be forwarded to the court. The court shall take the evaluation into
consideration in determining an appropriate sentence. If a copy of
the completed evaluation has not been provided to the court, the
court may proceed to sentence the defendant; however, in such
event, it shall be presumed that alcohol treatment is required
unless the defendant makes a showing by a preponderance of
evidence that treatment is not required. If the defendant has not
made a good faith effort to provide the completed copy of the
evaluation to the court, the court may consider the failure of the
defendant to provide the report as an aggravating circumstance in
determining an appropriate sentence.
Idaho Code § 18-8005(9). Consequently, it was Corwin's responsibility to
provide the evaluation to the court. His failure to do so did not preclude him from
being sentenced and is, therefore, not a basis for claiming error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Corwin's conviction and
sentence,
DATED this 2nd day of March 2009.
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